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Summary findings
Herrera and Perry  test for the existence  of asset  price  In general,  the authors find  that the marginal
bubbles  in Latin  America  in 1980-2001, focusing  mainly  probabilities  of common  and country-specific  variables
on stock  prices.  Based  on unit root and cointegration  are of roughly  the same  order of magnitude.  This finding
tests, they find that they cannot reject the hypothesis  of  contrasts  with those of previous  studies  that real asset
bubbles.  They  arrive at the same  conclusion  using  Froot  returns in Latin America  are dominated  by local  factors.
and Obstfeld's  intrinsic  bubbles  model.  Finally,  the authors explore  the main  channels  through
To examine  empirical  regularities  of these bubble  which asset  prices  affect real  economic  activity,  with the
episodes  in the region,  the authors identify  periods of  most important  being the balance  sheet  effect  and its
significant  stock price overvaluation.  They  quantify  the  impact  on bank lending.  They show  how the allocation
relative  importance  of different  factors  that determine  of bank lending  across  different  sectors  responded
the probability  of bubble  occurrence,  focusing  on the  sensitively  to real estate prices  during  the boom years  in
contrast  between  the country-specific  variables  and the  countries  that experienced  banking crises.  Thus asset
common  external  factors.  They include  as country-  price bubbles  have  long-lasting  effects  in the financial
specific  variables  both the level  and the volatility  of  sector and, through this channel,  on growth. Another
domestic  credit growth,  the volatility  of asset returns, the  channel  through which asset  prices-particularly stock
capital flows  to each country, and the terms of trade. As  market  prices-affect long-run  growth is through their
common  external variables,  they consider  the degree of  effect  on investment.  The authors find  a strong  positive
asset overvaluation  in the U.S.  stock and real  estate  association  between  stock  prices and investment  and a
markets  and the term spread  of U.S.  Treasury  securities.  negative  effect  of stock  price volatility  on investment.  An
To quantitatively  assess  the relative  importance  of each  additional  motive  for the central bank to monitor asset
factor, they estimate  a logit model  for a panel of five  prices  is the general  coincidence  of the crash episodes
Latin American  countries  from 1985  to 2001.  identified  by the authors  with currency  crises  in the
region in the past two decades.
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I. INTRODUCTION  AND SUMMARY
The past decade began in a festive mood in Latin America, with policymakers welcoming
the future that had finally arrived with its rewards: growth, rising asset prices, rising
investment-to-GDP  ratios, strong capital inflows, and booming  domestic credit. The
decade ended, however, on a gloomy note:  stagnant growth, falling investment ratios,
stagnant or falling asset prices, sluggish domestic credit, and several crippled banking
systems. How do we account for this transition, and can we explain the interactions
among all these variables? In particular, what is the relationship  between the credit boom
(external and domestic) and the behavior of asset prices? Is the bust related to the boom?
Is the behavior of asset prices governed  by fundamentals, or do asset prices in Latin
America reflect the presence of bubbles, as in other emerging market economies (Sarno
and Taylor, 1998)? To address these issues, we divide the present paper into three main
chapters after this introduction.
Chapter II describes the evolution of asset prices in Latin America, summarizes the
statistical tests for the existence of bubbles, and identifies chronologically the periods of
significant asset overvaluation, as well as the crash episodes. This analysis is based
mostly on data for stock market prices, and, to a lesser extent (because of limited data
availability), on real estate prices. To identify periods of asset overvaluation we used
Froot and Obstfeld's (1991) intrinsic bubbles model as a benchmark, given its tractability
and parsimony. This chapter concludes with a generalized rejection of the no-bubbles
hypothesis and with the identification of significant stock overvaluation episodes that
were synchronized  across the region only in the early 1990s. Most bubbles were followed
by stock market crashes, with the resulting prices being lower than those before the
bubble formed. Crash episodes also tended to lead or coincide  with currency crises
documented  in several papers on this related topic (Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart,
1997).
Chapter III identifies empirical regularities that characterize the significant over-
valuation  periods. We quantify the relative importance of different factors that determine
the probability of bubble occurrence, focusing on the contrast between the country-
specific variables and the common external factors. We included in the country-specific
variables (a) both the level and the volatility of domestic credit growth, (b) the volatility
of asset returns, (c) capital flows to each country, and (d) the terms of trade. As common
external  variables, we considered (a) the degree of asset overvaluation in the stock market
and the real estate market in the U.S., and (b) the term spread of U.S. Treasury securities.
To quantitatively  assess the relative importance of each factor, we estimated a Logit
model for a panel of five Latin American countries from 1985 to 2001. In general, we
found that the marginal probabilities of both common and country-specific  variables were
roughly of the same order of magnitude. This contrasts with previous studies that found
that real asset returns in Latin America were dominated by local factors (Harvey, 1995;
Hargis and Maloney, 1997). The single most important determinant of bubbles was the
U.S. term spread as it predicts future real interest rates and future economic activity in the3
U.S.  Domestic credit growth was the second most important factor. Other relevant
factors were the volatility of credit growth and the volatility of real asset returns, as
predicted by recent models that explain bubbles based on financial intermediary  behavior
(Allen and Gale, 2000).
Chapter IV explores some empirical channels through which asset prices affect real
economic activity. One of the main channels through which asset prices may affect
activity is the balance-sheet effect and bank lending. We investigate and present
evidence about how the allocation of bank lending across different sectors responded
sensitively to real estate prices during the boom years in countries that experienced
banking crises. Thus, asset price bubbles have long-lasting consequences in the financial
sector, and, through this channel, on growth. Another channel through which asset
prices-in  particular stock market prices-affect  log-run growth is their effect on
investment. We found (a) a strong positive association between stock prices and
investment, and (b) a negative effect of stock price volatility on investment. Regarding
stabilization policy, stock prices in Latin America also provide information about future
consumption and investment. To the extent that stock prices incorporate information
about future aggregate demand, the central bank may benefit from monitoring them as a
means of anticipating the future course of inflation. An additional motive for the central
bank to monitor asset prices is the general coincidence of the crash episodes identified in
this paper with currency crises experienced in the region in the last two decades.
Chapter V draws conclusions and discusses some policy implications.
II.  DO TROPICAL  BUBBLES  EXIST?  WHAT DO THEY LOOK LIKE?
A. Evolution of asset prices in Latin America 2
The evolution of stock prices in Latin America (LAC) since the 1980s (Graph 1) can be
divided in two sub-periods:
1.  During the 1  980s, prices (in real terms) showed no clear trend, and there were
some spikes in Argentina, Brazil, and (to a lesser extent) Mexico. The price spike
episodes of the 1980s  were preceded by high and rising inflation.
2.  During the 1  990s, there was a substantial price increase in the early years that was
stabilized,  and even reversed in the latter part of the decade. Only in Brazil did
the rising trend continue throughout the whole decade.
Another feature of stock prices in LAC during this period was their recurrent crashes,
particularly  in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. In Chile and Colombia, these sudden falls
were less frequent.
2 A  full  description  of the  variables  used  in this  paper  and  their  sources  is  presented  in  Appendix  A.4
Returns in stock markets across the region (Graph 2) were positively and highly
correlated (table 1). The highest correlation coefficients are between Chile and Mexico
(0.92), Colombia and Mexico (0.87), Chile and Colombia (0.86), Argentina and Chile
(0.82), Mexico and Argentina (0.81). Across time, however, these correlations seem to
have changed. computing the correlation coefficients with a 24-month rolling window,
we observe that, for the biggest three countries, these are stationary;  however, there is a
structural change in the generating  processes in the early 1990s (Graph 3).3
Finally, there is a positive association between stock prices and dividends (normalized) in
most countries (Graph 4). Both variables tend to move together, although there are
periods when they diverge. Colombia seems to be the only case in which the series are
clearly divergent.
Comparing these results with those from East Asian countries-Indonesia,  Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailand-we  find that, for most countries, correlations  of stock returns
are around 0.50 or lower. The only exception is the correlation between Malaysia and
Thailand of 0.86 (Table Al in Appendix A). Thus, stock return correlations are lower in
Asia than in LAC. As for change in these East Asian correlations over time, there is no
clear evidence  of structural breaks in the correlations as was the case in the big three
LAC countries (Graph Al  in Appendix A.)
Regarding real estate prices (Graph 5), we constructed proxies by using the rent
component of the CPI, deflated by the overall index. We were able to build this proxy for
Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico, which were the only countries where we had data
availability since the 1980s.  In the case of Mexico, there is a strong correlation between
this proxy and the index of the value of urban land in Mexico City constructed by Banco
de Mexico (Guerra, 1997). A boom in real estate prices occurred in Mexico in 1988-91,
in Argentina in 1990-93, and in Colombia in 1993-96.  We also present real estate prices
in two affluent neighborhoods of Santiago de Chile in 1975-82,4  as reported by Conley
and Maloney (1995).
Graphs 6a and 6b show the evolution of returns on real estate investment  in Mexico and
the U.S., as captured by our proxies.5 For the whole sample period, there is no
correlation (Graph 6a); however, there is a correlation of 0.70 after 1995 (Graph 6b).
B. Testing for Bubbles: The Latin American Case
1.  Overview of bubble testing
3 The  tests  for  stationarity  and  structural  change  were  those  of  Perron  (1994).  For  the  correlation  between
Brazil  and  Mexico,  the  structural  change  is  in 1991:11,  while  that  for  Argentina  and  Mexico  is in 1991:06.
The  Argentina-Brazil  break  occurs  at  an earlier  date-1985:06.
4 The  data  were  extracted  weekly  from  El  Mercurio.  The  authors  thank  Bill  Maloney  for  making  the  data
available.
5For  the  U.S.  we  consider  the  return  index  of  real  estate  investment  trusts  (REITS)  as computed  by  the
NAREIT.  For  Mexico,  it is the y-o-y  growth  rate of the housing  price  index  we  constructed.5
Theoretic and empirical work on bubbles is vast. We will briefly summarize the more
relevant work for our purposes, given that well-known surveys have already been done:
Camerer (1989) performed a general survey of both the theoretical and empirical
literature, while Flood and Hodrick (1990) concentrated on the empirical branch. A more
recent survey of both approaches can be found in Campbell  (2000).
In general, a bubble (Bt) is defined as the difference between the fundamentals-
determined  price (PPV)  and the observed price (Pt). In the case of stocks, the
fundamentals  price can be expressed as the sum of discounted expected future cash
flows-or  dividends-to  the holder of the asset. 6
p  = pPP  + B  (1)
The bubble  term, B, if it exists, is expected to grow at the real rate of interest. 7
The bulk of the bubble-testing literature falls into three types of tests. The first type
examines the relationship between (a) the observed price and (b) the present-value  price
or the fundamentals  used to forecast it. For example, tests of the bubble hypothesis in
exchange rates examine the existence of a long-run equilibrium (cointegrating)
relationship  among exchange rates, money supplies, and prices (Meese, 1986; Chin and
Meese, 1995; and Mark, 1995). Tests of the bubble hypothesis in stock markets examine
the existence of equilibrium (cointegrating)  relationships between prices and dividends
(Campbell and Shiller, 1987 and Campbell, Lo, and McKinlay, 1997).  A second type of
bubble test compares the volatilities of observed prices and the present-value  prices
(Shiller, 1981; Le Roy and Porter, 1981; and West, 1988). The third type of test is more
elaborate and indirect; it estimates a reduced-form price equation by two alternative
methods and verifies whether the parameter values are the same.
The first method is a simple (instrumental  variables) projection of prices onto the
information  set of the fundamentals  forecasting. The second method is a simultaneous
estimation of two equations: The first is the fundamental forecasting process, and the
second is a reduced-form equation that assumes no bubbles and imposes cross-equation
restrictions as in Hansen-Sargent (1981). If certain parameters are estimated as being the
same by both methods, then the no-bubble hypothesis cannot be rejected. This approach,
pioneered by West (1987) for stock market prices, has been used by Casella (1989) for
price level bubbles and by Meese (1986) for exchange rate bubbles.
Testing for bubbles is plagued with problems and obstacles. At a theoretical level,
reconciling  rational behavior with the existence of bubbles is not trivial, and the
conditions  under which they can emerge are quite restrictive (Santos and Woodford,
6  pP  =E  e, r(s 1+l)E,  [D,]  is one  solution  to the  equation  P, = erE,  [D,  + Pt,,  ]. It is the
s=t
particular  solution  attained  after  imposing  a transversality  condition.
The bubble tern is generally described as Bt+ 1= Bt  (l+r)  + bt, where b t+ is the innovation in the bubble at
time  t+l (Flood  and  Hodrick,  1990).6
1997). This is an ongoing topic of debate in several papers presented in this conference
and in the academic literature (Shiller, 2001). To reconcile rational behavior with bubbles
in asset prices, researchers shifted to some type of market imperfection  to explain this
apparently  less-than-rational outcome. From this perspective,  the Allen-Gale (2000)
model is of particular interest, because it links asset price bubbles to financial
internediary behavior. In this model, bubbles 8 arise because of an informational
asymmetry between the borrowers and the bank: given the limited liability of borrowers,
they bid up the price of assets that are in fixed supply, with the cost of the excessive risk
being borne by the intermediary. In this setting, the volatility of real returns affects the
probability (and magnitude) of bubbles. The magnitude and uncertainty of credit
expansion is also an important determinant of bubbles in this model. Other models
(Krugman, 1998) also link bubbles to financial sector developments,  but, in most cases,
the results are based on implicit guarantees  that lead to risk-shifting. The Allen-Gale
model does not require these conditions.
Other problems with bubble tests arise from the empirical side.  First, the procedures are
generally  a joint test of a fundamentals-forecasting  equation and the transversality
condition. Therefore, the rejection of "no bubbles" implies a rejection of the underlying
model and the transversality condition (Meese, 1986). Related to the issue of the
underlying  model, Flood and Garber (1980) pointed out, in their seminal paper on testing
for bubbles, how omitted variables may explain the behavior of prices that the analyst
incorrectly concludes have dynamics independent  from fundamentals,  biasing the test
towards rejection of"no bubbles." The finding that bubble behavior is observationally
equivalent  to that of expected future regime changes (Hamilton and Whiteman, 1985 and
Flood and Hodrick, 1986) points in the same direction. Hence, the inability to reject the
"no bubble" hypothesis can be consistent with a non-bubble present value price whose
fundamentals-generating  processes are expected to change in the future.
2  Tests for the asset price bubble hypothesis in Latin America
Bubble tests applied to the Latin American case are very scarce. Among the most recent
treatments of the topic is an application of a test to Argentina's exchange rate, price level,
and money stock (Hall, et.al., 1999). The paper rejects the no-bubble hypothesis in the
series for a time period that matches our own findings for stock prices, described in the
next section. A second paper describes  the specific topic of bubbles in housing prices in
affluent neighborhoods  of Santiago de Chile in the late 1970s and early 1980s  (Conely
and Maloney, 1995). Nonetheless, this paper falls short of any empirical testing of the
hypothesis, since that was not the paper's objective. Two papers on the related topic of
predictability  of asset returns in emerging markets (Harvey, 1995 and Hargis and
Maloney, 1997)  reach opposite conclusions  on the relationship between asset prices and
8 In the Allen-Gale  model,  the fundamentals-determined  price  is defined  as the price  that  would  prevail  in
the absence  of risk-shifting,  i.e.,  in a perfect  information  setting  and with  no limited  liability  in  the debt
contract.7
fundamentals: (a) the Harvey paper concludes that standard asset pricing models produce
large errors, fail to price assets correctly, and are unable to account for time variation in
expected returns; (b) on the other hand, the Hargis and Maloney  paper concludes that
equity markets in Latin America (and East Asia) do reflect expected cash flows and
correctly  incorporate domestic and global shocks.
With the caveats derived from the previous section, we choose the tests with the simplest
structure as proposed by Campbell, Lo, and McKinlay (1997), and those used to test for
bubbles in other emerging market economies (Sarno and Taylor, 1999).  The general idea
is to verify or reject the existence of a stable (non-explosive) relationship  among stock
prices, dividends, and returns.
The equation that establishes the basis for the tests (see Appendix B for a derivation) is:
-t  P,  l  - ip  +E[-E  [  O (-Ad,,,+  +r,+i+j)]  (2)
where di=log  dividends
Pt= log prices
rt= return
Given the accounting  identity nature of the above equation, 9 if prices go up, either
dividends go up, or expected future returns go down to maintain the dividend-to-price
ratio stationary.  Hence, the tests are oriented toward examining  the stationary (or
explosive)  behavior of the log dividend-price ratio and the existence of a stable
relationship  among dividends, prices, and returns.
Accordingly,  we perform two types of tests. First, we check for unit roots in the log
dividend-price  ratio and in the real return series.  If dividends follow an I(1) process, their
difference is stationary. Then, the return series must be of the same order of integration as
the dividend-price  ratio. The idea is that, if the series have unit roots, the "no bubble"
hypothesis is rejected. Second, we check for a cointegrating relationship between the log
dividend-price  ratio and returns. If a stable (equilibrium) relationship is rejected, then the
"no bubble"  hypothesis is also rejected.
a.  Unit root tests
Standard  Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF) for series with bubbles may result in
accepting  stationarity, even though the series are in fact explosive, because the recurrent
collapse of the bubble may resemble a mean reversing process (Evans, 1991). Results for
the ADF (unit root) tests are in table B I of Appendix B. For most countries, total return
and (log) dividend yields have a unit root. The standard ADF tests reject the unit root
hypothesis in Argentina (both series) and Mexico (dividend yield), although the results
9  This  point  is emphasized  by Campbell  (2000),  noting  that  this equation  is derived  from  an identity,  solved
forward  imposing  the restriction  of a transversality  condition  and  taking  expected  values.8
are not robust to the inclusion of a deterministic time trend. Hence, for most countries,
the bias toward accepting stationarity due to periodically collapsing bubbles was not a
problem, except for the possible exceptions of Argentina and Mexico.'0
To correct the potential bias in the standard  unit root (and cointegration)  tests, Taylor and
Peel (1998) propose a residuals-augmented least squares (RALS),  briefly described  in
Appendix B. The main idea is to introduce into the standard ADF tests an auxiliary  term
that mitigates the skew and kurtosis originating from the collapsing prices.
Results for the RALS unit root test are shown in Table B.3 (Appendix B), and
summarized in table 2. These results are similar to those obtained with the ADF test.
Total returns and log dividend yield are non-stationary series in most countries (Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, and Peru). However, the unit root hypothesis is rejected for stock
returns in Argentina and for the dividend yield in Mexico.'  I  Hence, in most countries we
are unable to reject the unit root hypothesis, implying bubble behavior in stock prices
during the sample period. We proceed to verify these conclusions  with the cointegration
tests.
b. Cointegration  tests
To verify (or reject) the hypothesis of the existence of a long-run relationship between the
log dividend-price  ratio and real returns, we use three alternative tests: the standard
Johansen cointegration test, the RALS cointegration test, and the autoregressive
distributed lag (ARDL) method. The ARDL has the advantage of circumventing  the issue
of pre-testing for unit roots, given that the tests are valid regardless of the order of
integration of the variables (Pesaran, et. al., 1999).
Table 2 summarizes the results.1 2 Both the standard Johansen and the RALS
cointegration tests reject the hypothesis of a long-run relationship between total returns
and the log of dividend yield in all the countries.  13 Finally, the ARDL method rejects the
existence  of a long-run relationship, except for the case of Argentina, in the particular
case in which the regression includes time trend.
Thus, the main results and conclusions of this section can be summarized  as follow:
*  Returns are non-stationary when performing ordinary ADF tests. This result is
confirmed by the Taylor-Peel RALS test, with the possible exception of
Argentina, when a deterministic time trend is included.
10  The  rejection  of the  unit root  hypothesis  in  both  Argentina  and  Mexico  depends  on whether  the trend  or
the constant  is included.  In Argentina  when  a constant,  but  no trend,  is included,  the unit root  cannot  be
rejected.  This  is simply  noted  to show  the ambiguity  of the results  concerning  the "no  bubble"  hypothesis
in  these  two  countries.
" Argentina's  result  is sensitive  to the inclusion  of a constant  and  a time  trend  in  the regression  of the null
hypothesis.
]2 See  tables  B2  to B5 in appendix  B for  detailed  results.
13 The  Johansen  test  (table  2) shows  two  cointegrating  vectors  for  Argentina  and  Mexico.  This  problem
(given  that  the test  is for cointegration  among  two  variables)  is not present  in  the RALS  test.9
*  Log dividend yield is non-stationary with ADF and the RALS tests, with the
possible exception of Mexico, when a deterministic time trend is included in the
regression.
*  Log dividend-yield and returns are not cointegrated according to the standard
Johansen tests, and, using the ARDL method, we reject the hypothesis of a long-
run relationship between these variables. Argentina is an exception in the case in
which the null includes a time trend.
All of the above tests lead to the general rejection of the hypothesis of no-bubbles in
stock prices in this group of Latin American countries between 1980 and 2001, with
some ambiguity in Argentina's case.
C. When have bubbles occurred, and how persistent are they?
The previous section rejected the "no bubble" hypothesis for stock prices in Latin
America. This section aims at identifying periods when observed prices differed
significantly  from the fundamentals-determined  price, based on Froot and Obstfeld's
(1991) intrinsic bubbles model. This model is useful to explain persistent over- or under-
valuation and has the advantage of being parsimonious. In addition, as a direct
application, the authors separate the present value component from the bubble
component, which is our objective. In its simplest version, bubbles depend on
fundamentals  (dividends) only. In more elaborate versions, bubbles can be made to be
functions of time.
Froot and Obstfeld set up the basic model of the stock price-dividend relationship 14 and
arrive at the following expression for stock prices described in equation (1):
P, = P,  PV + B,
where Pt, the stock price, is equated to Pt Pv,  the present discounted value of expected
future dividend payments, 15 and Bt, the bubble term (if it exists), is expected  to grow at
the real interest rate.'6
To find a simple, closed-form solution for pPv,  some assumption  has to be made about
future dividend growth or the dividend-generating  process. Froot and Obstfeld show that
if the log dividend process is generated by
dt+l  =  p + d, +  ~,,+  (3)
1P,  = e  E, [D,  +  P,+,
15 pPV  =  rer(s-t+l)Et  [D.]
s=t
16 Bt = e  -r'Et [B,,, 10
where p is the trend growth in dividends and 4t is a (0,02)  normal random variable,
then the present value price is proportional to dividends:
PV
P,  =  KD,  (4)
where K = (er_eA+U)
r = return on stocks over the whole sample period, and
1 af are, respectively, the trend growth rate of log(dividends)  and the standard deviation
of the residuals of an AR(1) process describing the dividends  (equation 3).  17
Since, for each country, we have r and can obtain estimates  of "0  '  from a regression of
equation (3), we calibrate the value of K.'8  Hence, the bubble component can be
approximated  by the difference  between the observed price and the Ppv. 19 Graph 7 shows
the (normalized) observed prices and the present-value prices for Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and Mexico. This simple approximation shows that during the 1990s there were
persistent deviations of the observed price from the estimated  present-value price.
Argentina is the only exception, but there were significant,  although very transitory
deviations in the 1980s.
Froot and Obstfeld estimate a more complicated version of their model, where bubbles
depend not only on dividends,  but also on time, 20 of the following  type: 21
12D  =  c0+ciD  +c2Dt  +gX  (5)
!7 Sellin  (1998)  also  uses  this assumption  on  the dividend  process  to obtain  a simple  solution  for the
present-value  price.
Is Appendix  C, Table  C I shows  coefficients  for Latin American  countries  and  the U.S.
19 An important assumption is that dividends at time t are known before setting the price.  This way, any
"news" effect is captured immediately by the present-value price. Empirically,  however, because of timing
issues, (distributed) dividends not necessarily reflect all the news, we might have a problem of identifying
as  a  bubble something  that  is simply the  price  responding to news that the  dividend  series did not
incorporate. This  methodological problem  translates  into  the  fact  that  prices  should contain  useful
information to forecast future dividends.  To examine the extent of this problem we ran Granger causality
tests between the (differenced) log prices and log dividends up to twelve lags, and only in Argentina did we
find robust significant evidence of prices Granger-causing dividends.  In the other four countries we reject
the hypothesis  that prices contain useful information beyond that in current dividends.  Froot and Obstfeld
reject causality from prices to dividends in the case of the U.S.
20  Their simplest model, where  bubbles depend  on  fundamentals (dividends) only,  is  of  this type:
B(D,)  = cDI  where X  is the positive root of the dynamic system  220.  / 2 +AU  -r  = 0  and c is a
constant.  By  adding  the  present  value  price  and  the  bubble  term  we  get
P(D,)  =  pv+  B(D,)  = kD, + cD,A which is a price with the bubble driven by fundamentals.
21 This is the model reported in Froot and  Obtfeld's  Table 4, augmented with the negative root part as
indicated  in their footnote 28.11
where  P = prices
D = dividends
X = a linear term on Dividends or a time trend. We included a quadratic time
trend also.
i,  i  are the positive and negative roots, respectively of the dynamic system
Al2  a2 /2 + 2u - r = 0 described above. The estimation of the nonlinear equation
was done restricting the values of these roots.
This model, besides allowing the quantification of the divergence of observed values
from the predicted values, is useful to verify the existence of bubbles. The null hypothesis
of no bubbles implies that cl = 0, while the alternative implies cl > 0.  The estimations
(Appendix C) lead to rejection of the "no bubble" hypothesis in all the cases except
Argentina. In all cases (Graph 8), deviations of the observed price from the predicted one
are persistent, frequent, and significant in size. Argentina is the only country that does
not have a bubble after 1992. These results are similar to those of the simpler model.
The timing of the bubbles tends to coincide in both approximations. 22 In Argentina,  there
is evidence of bubbles during the periods of hyperinflation from 1985 to 1989. Hall,
Psaradakis, and Sola (1999) identify bubbles for money supply, exchange rate, and prices
in 1985  and 1989, years for which we also find bubbles in the stock market.
Following the same procedure, we estimate the intrinsic bubble model for the U.S. and
obtain interesting results (Graph 9). First, we cannot reject the hypothesis of bubble
behavior, similar to Froot and Obstfeld's result and to the more recent ones of Bonds and
Cummins (2000). Second, the deviations of the observed price from the predicted one
show two periods of significant stock price overvaluation. One begins in 1986 and ends
in 1987 (the crash of 1987). The second one occurs in the second half of the 1990s.  The
significant  deviation of late 1997 was (temporarily) corrected in 1998, while the
overvaluation  in 2000 had not been corrected by the end of the year. 23 These results are
very similar to Reinhart's (1998) quantification  of overvalued stock prices in U.S. 24
Having quantified the over/under valuation of assets in the Latin American countries and
the U.S.,25  we examine the correlation of these measures across time. For the period
22 The residuals are the difference between the observed price and the predicted price.  Since the predicted
price  already  has a bubble  component,  this approximation  underestimates  the size of the bubble  and  might
lead  us to overlook  a bubble  episode  when  it actually  existed.  This  residual  can  be considered  as the
innovation  in the bubble.
23 The  data come  from  Robert  Shiller's  book,  Irrational  Exuberance,  and  can be found  on  his webpage.  He
has  dividend  data  until December  2000,  and  hence  the model  was estimated  until  that date.
24 Reinhart  uses  a cointegration  approach  to verify  the equilibrium  relationship  between  the price-to-
earnings  ratio  and  fundamentals  for  the period 1980-96.  His results  of departures  from  the predicted  model
are summarized  in Figure  I of his  paper.
25 We  tried  to quantify  for  the East Asian  countries  the degree  of departure  from  the benchmark  cases,  and
we  did not  obtain  any  significant  departures  after 1995. This  is a strange  result,  given  that  we  reject,  as
Sarno and Taylor do, the no-bubbles hypothesis. The only explanation seems to be that all the bubbles
happened  before  1995. Future  versions  of this paper  will  present  this,  together  with  the crashes  in  East
Asian countries.12
1980-2001 (Table 3) we note very low correlation coefficients (recall that stock returns
were highly correlated). A second striking feature is the negative sign between deviations
from the model in the U.S. and in the Latin countries, except in Mexico, where it is
negligible. These correlations  are significantly lower than those found among
industrialized nations for a similar time period (IMF, 1998).26  For example, the
correlation coefficients were of the following order: U.S.-Canada,  0.58; U.S.-U.K. 0.65;
U.S.-Germany, 0.44; Germany-France,  0.49.
Restricting the sample period to 1995-2001, we note that correlation coefficients
increase, with the most notable changes being the rise in the Mexico-U.S. coefficient to
0.40, and the negative coefficient of Brazil-U.S., -0.27 (Table 4).The negative correlation
between the Brazilian data and other Latin American countries is also found by others
(Harvey, 1995), although for a different sample period.
Based on this section's results, we build a dummy variable for bubble periods, which will
be used in following sections.  The dummy takes the unit value whenever  there is a
significant  departure of stock prices from their present-value price or from the price
predicted by the intrinsic bubble model. 27 Leaving the negative deviations aside, 28 we
labeled these as bubble episodes (Table 5), and will use these in subsequent sections.
Regarding  real estate prices, apart from noting periods of rapid growth, we are uriable to
identify departures of observed prices from the fundamentals,  because we are using one
of the most important fundamentals,  rent, to build our price proxy. 29
D. Most (but not all) bubbles end in crashes, and there are crashes without bubbles.
To describe the evolution of stock prices and determine crash periods, we follow Patel
and Sarkar (1998) in the construction of an auxiliary variable defined as the ratio of the
stock market price to the maximum value of the series up to that time period. This
variable,  referred to as CMAX, is bound to take values between zero and one. Patel and
Sarkar define a crash period for Latin America (treated as a whole region) when the price
index falls more than 35% relative to the historical maximum. One of the advantages of
this variable is its wide use among equity market practitioners, which facilitates the
interpretation  of some results. Another advantage is that it provides a date for the onset
of the crash and a date for the trough, i.e., the point at which the price index reaches its
minimum level during the crisis. Finally, we have a benchmark with which our results
can be compared.
26  In  the  1998  World  Economic Outlook, the  IMF computed  deviations  of actual  prices  from  predicted  stock
prices  and  calculated  the correlations  between  1985  and 1999.
27 Appendix  C  presents  the  details.
28 The  literature  has  generally  ruled  out  the  existence  of  negative  bubbles,  because  they  would  imply
negative  stock  prices  (Diba  and  Grossman,  1988  and Froot  and Rogoff,  1991). However,  Allen  and Gale
(2000b) consider  the case  where  stock  prices  fall  below  their fundamental  values.
29 In the  case  of  the  U.S.,  we  consider  deviations  of  the  proxy  from  a Hodrick  Prescott  trend  in a later  part
of the paper.13
Once the CMAX variable was computed (see Appendix C) we endogenously determined
the country-specific thresholds such that, if the CMAX fell below this level, the episode
was catalogued as a crash. The endogenous threshold selection  was done by means of the
Self-Exciting  Threshold Autoregression (SETAR) mechanism (Potter, 1995).3°  In this
fashion, events were classified as crashes if the CMAX fell below the following  threshold
levels: Argentina, 31%; Brazil, 63%; Chile,79%; Colombia, 87%; and Mexico, 70%.?
As an alternative to working with the CMAX variable,  we used the monthly percentage
changes of the stock price indexes in real terms and determined  endogenously  the
country-specific  threshold using the SETAR method. The monthly percentage falls
exceeding the following threshold levels were considered  crash episodes: Argentina,
34%; Brazil, 22%; Chile, 11%; Colombia, 11%; and Mexico, 11%.
Having determined crash periods with the two methods, we combine this information
with the bubble periods for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Graph 10
and Table 5 show results for bubbles and crashes identified by each of the methodologies.
Crash type 1 identifies crash periods with the CMAX, while crash type 2 relates to the
crashes identified with the monthly percentage changes of the stock prices.
We observe that there are more crashes than bubbles. While there are 22 bubbles in the
1980-2001 period, there are between 24 and 41 crashes depending on the method of
identification. Bubbles and crashes have similar average durations: bubbles persist for 8
months, while crashes last 10 months. 32 The average price increase during bubbles is
173%33,  while the average price fall in crashes is 181 %.
Most bubbles end in crashes: 14 out of 22 bubbles (64%) end up bursting. In these types
of bubble episodes, which are clearly associated with crash episodes, generally  the stock
market price resulting after the crash is lower than that prevailing before the bubble; in 12
out of the 14 episodes, prices were lower after the crash than before the bubble.
We also note that there are crashes not preceded by bubbles.  Most of these episodes are
related to foreign crises. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico show crashes not preceded
by bubbles in the periods of the Asian crises (1997:10) and the Russian crisis (1998:08).
The U.S. stock market crash in 1987 is also reflected in crashes in Brazil, Chile, and
Mexico.
30 Patel  and  Sankar  worked  in nominal  figures,  while  we  use  real  stock  prices.  The  variable  is  regressed
against  its own  lags,  each  time  with  a different  dummy  "threshold'  variable.  The  threshold  selected
corresponds  to the  regression  with  a lower  likelihood  ratio  or  Akaike  information  criterion.  See  Appendix
C  for  a detailed  explanation  and  tables  of the  CMAX  variables  for  each  country.
31 In the U.S.,  the threshold  CMAX  was  94%.
32 The crash duration refers to the time elapsing between the point when the threshold is surpassed and the
moment the CMAX reaches a minimum.
33 This percentage increase is computed by comparing the prices at the beginning and end of the bubble.
However, the price increase  is larger if you consider the percentage change between the maximum  price
during  the bubble and the beginning price.  This happens because the maximum price is reached before the
bubble ends.14
Similarly,  most countries register a crash in the first or second quarter of 1994, when
there was a shift in U.S. monetary policy: Between February and June the Federal
Reserve funds rate was increased 4 times, signaling a clear change in policy direction.
According to these results, the Tequila crisis can be thought of as beginning with the
bursting of the bubble in the Mexican stock market by the second quarter of 1994 and the
intervention of two banks in September 1994, before the well-known episodes that
followed. Later, in the first months of 1995, after the devaluation  of the peso, there is
evidence of a second crash in Mexico. In Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, there are also
price crashes in the first quarter of 1994, clearly associated with the same external event.
Finally, we wish to note that most of the crash periods lead or coincide with currency
crises documented elsewhere (Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1996) (Appendix C),
and this explains why including the stock market price improves the performance  of early
warning systems of currency crisis (Herrera and Garcia, 1999).
III. DETERMINANTS OF BUBBLES
This chapter seeks to identify the main determinants of the probability of a bubble
occurrence, in the vein of the international  business cycle theory that allows for domestic
stock returns to be affected by foreign economic activity and foreign financial variables,
in addition to domestic factors (Canova-De  Nicolo, 1995). Initially, we describe
graphically some empirical features of the data to elucidate the statistical results
presented in the latter part of the chapter.
A. Stock prices, capital flows, domestic credit growth, and terms of trade: Stylized
facts and motivating evidence
Graphic analysis (Graphs 11 to 16) shows the evolution of stock prices (in real terms),
capital flows, and domestic credit in the biggest LAC countries. Stock prices show a
non-stationary  behavior, with a significant change in level in the early 1  990s. To have a
better idea of the timing of these changes, we used Zivot and Andrews (1992) and
Vogelsang and Perron (1998) tests for structural breaks. Additionally,  we tried Self-
Exciting Threshold  Autoregression (SETAR) methods to determine approximate break-
points in the series. Different methods yield different results (Table 6), but in Argentina,
Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, we determine a structural break in the stock price series in
mid-  1991.
Capital flows are mean-reverting processes with a change in mean.  This change took
place in 1991 in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Domestic credit growth is also stationary,
with structural  breaks taking place in the early 1  990s, except in Mexico, where it
happened in 1988.15
There are two other interesting empirical regularities. First, the relationship between
terms-of-trade  positive shocks and the occurrence of bubbles (Graph 17) seems to have
been important in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Colombia. Second,  the realization of the
relationship between domestic credit growth and the bubble episodes (Graph 18) seems to
take place with a long lag. Almost all of the bubble episodes were preceded by a cycle of
credit boom, but in Mexico the bubble surges once the acceleration  has ceased.
B. Determinants  of bubbles in Latin America
We wish to examine whether there is some statistical support for the empirical
regularities described graphically in the previous section. With statistical analysis, we
can gauge the relative importance of the different factors affecting  the divergence of asset
prices from their fundamentals-determined  prices.
Our empirical exercise follows the thrust of the international business cycle theory that
analyzes the relationship  between (a) stock returns in one country and (b) foreign
indicators of economic activity and foreign financial variables (Canova-De  Nicolo,
1995). Empirically,  this approach has been used to explain asset returns in emerging
markets (Harvey, 1995 and Hargis-Maloney, 1997), based on information sets that
contain both local and global variables.
Among the country-specific factors, we included domestic credit expansion,  volatility of
credit growth, and volatility of asset returns. One could justify the inclusion of these
variables based on the Allen-Gale bubbles model. Other country-specific  variables were
capital flows and terms-of-trade shocks, 34 though they are "external." The common
external factors were the degree of overvaluation in asset prices (stocks and real estate) 35
in the U.S.A. and the spread between 10-year bonds and 3-month Treasury bills. 36 This
last variable is included to incorporate agents' expectations of future real interest rates in
the U.S., or of the future course of economic activity (Estrella and Mishkin, 1997; Fama,
1990). If future output is expected to be high, consumption-smoothing  agents will
borrow against it and bid up interest rates (Chen, 1991). Alternatively, if the term spread
is a good predictor of inflation, a rise in the spread anticipates future falls in real interest
rates, as has been shown (Fama, 1990). Both effects lead to a positive expected sign in
the coefficient of the term spread.
34 Tenns  of trade  were  introduced  in deviations  from  a Hodrick-Prescott  trend.
35 As a proxy of stock overvaluation in the U.S., we took the residuals from the intrinsic bubble model. As
a proxy of real estate overvaluation, we considered deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott trend of the returns
of equity real estate investment trusts (REIT).
36 The spread between 1  0-year bonds and 3-month bills contains information about future changes in
interest rates (Campbell and Shiller, 1987 and Mishkin, 1988) or future changes in economic activity
(Estrella  and Hardouvelis, 1991 and Chen, 1991). On the use of stock market prices and a proxy for real
estate simultaneously,  several studies have found a negative correlation between stock returns and real
estate returns in the U.S. (Ibbotson and Siegel, 1984; Hartzell, 1986; and Worzala and Vandell, 1993). For
this reason, some analysts recommend real estate investment as a hedging instrument for stock investments
(NAREIT,  2000). We did not include real interest rates as an explanatory variable, since they are used in
the construction of the bubble indicator to estimate the present-value price (to calibrate the value of K).16
Pooling monthly data for five countries since 1985, we estimated a Logit model 37 (Table
7) with satisfactory results. 38 All of the domestic variables were significant and had the
expected sign. Volatility of domestic credit and volatility of asset returns affect positively
the probability of bubble occurrence, as predicted by the Allen-Gale model. So do terms-
of-trade (positive) shocks and capital flows. Domestic credit growth has a negative sign
12 months prior to the bubble, but the sign is positive 18 months prior to the bubble,
reflecting the non-linear effect of this variable.
Regarding the external variables, a striking result was the opposite sign of the
overvaluation  proxies for stock markets and real estate. When stock markets in the U.S.
are overvalued, the probability of a bubble occurrence  in Latin American stock markets
declines. However, the probability is positively associated with overvaluation  in real
estate markets.  The only way to reconcile this result is through the negative or low
positive correlation between these asset classes in the U.S. The term structure spread is
significant and has the expected sign: higher-term structure spreads are leading indicators
of expanding economic activity or lower future real interest rates (Estrella and Mishkin,
1997 and Fama, 1990)
The marginal probabilities (Table 8) that tell us how the probability of a bubble changes
with a unit change in each individual  variable were calculated by estimating the marginal
effect at each observation and then taking the sample average. The differences across
countries arise because of the fixed-effects  coefficient, and because the values of the
explanatory  variables are different for each country. The term spread in the U.S. has the
largest marginal impact on bubble probability. This statistical result is confirmed by
observing the correlation between the term spread and the residuals of the intrinsic
bubble model (Graph 19), which is surprisingly close in the Mexican case. The second
most influential variable is domestic credit growth; the volatility of real asset returns and
terms-of-trade  shocks are of similar importance.
Even though our results are not directly comparable to Harvey's (1995) or to Hargis and
Maloney's (1997), given that they examine the impact of a set of variables on returns and
we examine the impact of a set of variables on the probability of bubble occurrence, the
general outcome reflecting the extent of the influence of global factors seems quite
different. Part of the discrepancy can be explained by the sample period, since both
papers examine data from 1976 to 1993, missing a great part of the economic
developments  of the 1990s which seem to dominate our results.
37 We estimate  both  Logit  and Probit  models,  and  the results  are almost  identical  (see  Appendix  D).
However,  we present  the Logit  exercise  in the main  text  of this  section,  given  the possibility  that  in some
cases  Probit  models  do not produce  consistent  estimators  with  fixed-effects  panel  methods  (Hsiao,  1997
and  Green,  1999).
38 The  model  was  estimated  with  instrumental  variables  to control  for  potential  endogeneity  of the domestic
variables.  Additionally,  to avoid  difficulties  in the interpretation  of the marginal  probabilities,  as well as to
facilitate  comparison  across variables,  we employed  standardized  variables  (subtracting  the mean and
dividing  by the standard  deviation  of the series)  to circumvent  the units problem. This  does not alter  the
signs  or significance  of the results  obtained  with  the raw  data.17
IV. ASSET PRICES, ECONOMIC  ACTIVITY,  AND  GROWTH
A. Stock prices and economic activity: Consumption and investment
In LAC countries, we found a clear direction of causality running from stock market
returns to consumption and investment (Table 9). The causality  between stock returns
and consumption can be justified on several grounds. First, there exists the wealth effect,
according to which agents' consumption decisions depend on wealth, which in turn is
affected by stock price movements. Given that stocks are not a widespread  forrn of
saving in LAC, this effect should not be important in explaining  the observed statistical
result. Second, stock prices might be signaling the future growth of the economy and,
hence, the future growth of labor income (Ward, 1999), which will affect consumption.
Third, as the perceived wealth of individuals changes positively, so does their
creditworthiness, allowing agents to increase their indebtedness  and/or to receive credit at
a lower cost.
The observed causal relationship between investment and stock prices can be explained
by Tobin's q theory: as stock prices change, then the ratio between the market valuation
of existing capital and the cost of new capital (Tobin's q) changes. As stock prices rise,
the cost of new capital falls relative to that of existing capital, and firms will acquire new
capital (invest). A second explanation for the observed relationship  between stock prices
and investment can be found along the lines of the second explanation for consumption:
stock prices convey information regarding the future growth of the economy and,
therefore, affect investment through this channel. Finally, the balance sheet effect may
also operate here: as asset prices change, so does firms' perceived creditworthiness  and
hence their access to credit.
Examining quarterly stock price and investment data for the 1990s (Graph 20), a clear
positive relationship emerges. To incorporate stock prices into a longer-run perspective
on the determinants of investment, we estimate a panel for five Latin American countries
from 1980 to 1999 with SUR methods (Table 10). The dependent variable is the ratio of
gross domestic investment to GDP while the explanatory variables were: foreign direct
investment (Borensztein, De Gregorio, Lee, 1998), a dummy variable reflecting situations
of state failure (from the Polity International database), government consumption
expenditure,  government capital expenditure, the log of stock prices, the volatility of
stock returns, and lagged growth (Seven and Solimano, 1993 and Cardoso, 1993).39  All
39 The panel was  estimated by Seemingly  Unrelated Regressions (SUR) with instrumental variables.
Appendix D shows that estimation with the original data does not alter the sign or significance  of any of the
results, and changes in the parameter values are relatively minor. The variables are all cointegrated
according to tests proposed by Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999), attenuating the autocorrelation of residuals
problem. These tests require balanced panels; consequently, for this purpose only, we discarded Colombia
from the sample, since it had stock price data only since 1984. (None of the results described in the text
changes when Colombia is excluded from the sample.) The dynamics of investment should be explored by
more elaborate  methods, but the number of observations poses a problem. Notwithstanding  this problem,
we estimated the panel with variables expressed in changes and levels; this approach deals with serial
correlation (Appendix  D).  The only significant variables turn out to be stock prices, the volatility of stock
returns, the state failure variable, and government capital expenditure.  With a larger set of countries and a
longer  time period, it can be shown (Herrera and Garcia, 2000) that govemment consumption and foreign18
of the variables had the expected sign. We wish to highlight the positive sign of the stock
prices and negative sign of the volatility variable. Hence, although bubbles may have a
positive effect through increases in stock markets, prices generally  end up lower than
before the bubble started. Other negative effects on investment are transmitted by the
increased volatility effect. Additionally, the adverse effect of bubbles on the financial
sector lasts for many years, negatively affecting growth, given the relationship between
financial intermediation and growth (Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000).
A bubble episode may lead to overinvestment, which, combined with the effect on
consumption,  may lead to domestic undersaving. These two factors combined should
produce larger current account deficits as asset prices tend to be overvalued. Graphical
inspection (Appendix E) shows this is likely to be true in the United States and Mexico.
However, other Latin American countries do not show any discernible  relationship, and
further work is required.
B. Housing prices and domestic credit
In the explanations  of the observed relationship between asset prices and consumption
and investment,  the credit channel played a significant role. Here, we explore in more
detail how asset price changes affect economic activity through the balance sheets of
agents that change their creditworthiness as asset prices change. There exists a close
relationship  between housing prices and domestic credit growth in the three countries
where we could get more complete series, namely Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico
(Graph 21), and in Chile in the late 1970s and early 1980s before the banking crisis. 40
Granger causality between asset prices and domestic credit goes in both directions;
however, when restricting the sample to the 1  990s only, the causality is stronger (larger F
statistics) from housing prices to domestic credit (Table Fl of Appendix F). Regarding
the relationship between stock prices and domestic credit, we found evidence of Granger
casuality from the stock returns to domestic credit growth (Table F2 of Appendix F).
These findings can be interpreted as suggestive evidence of balance-sheet effects
operating as described by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998). In their model, an
agent's external finance is more expensive than internal financing, and the premium for
external finance varies inversely with the net worth of potential borrowers. So, as asset
prices fall (in this case, real estate prices) the net worth of borrowers falls, and banks are
less willing to lend.
direct  investment  affect  the  investment  ratio,  with  the  signs  and  significance  indicated  in this  descriptive
exercise.
4 0 Conley  and  Maloney  (1995)  graph  date  series  for housing  prices  and  consumer  loans,  but do not link
their  behavior  relative  to each  other;  they  also  do not link  these  data to the banking  crisis  that  followed.
They  see  the behavior  of these  series  as separate  elements  of the euphoria  prevailing  in Chile  during  the
?eriod.
The causality  direction  changes  when  other  transformations  are used  (i.e.,  month-to-month  growth  rates
instead  of year-to-year).19
When asset prices rise, banks tend to lend more to the sectors affected by the bubble.
Mexico's case is revealing: as real estate prices fell in the early 1980s,  lending to the
construction and housing sectors fell as a percentage of total bank lending. When real
estate prices rose, the proportion of bank lending to these sectors doubled, reaching a
peak in 1995, when real estate prices stopped growing and reversed the trend (Table 11).
In Colombia, a similar relationship between real estate prices and credit to housing and
construction is observed.
When the crash occurs, non-performing loans rise as borrowers become insolvent, and
the ratio of non-perforning loans is greater in the housing sector (Table 12). In
Colombia, non-perforning loans jumped from 6% at the end of 1997 to 10% in 1999 and
to 13% at the end of 2000.
Argentina did not have a banking crisis of the magnitude experienced by Mexico or
Colombia. 42 In this country, credit to the construction sector did not increase during the
rise of real estate prices. On the contrary, it fell (Table 11) and a similar trend occurred in
housing mortgage credit. In the first quarter of 1991, credit to the construction sector was
6.7% of total credit; by the second quarter of 1994 it had fallen to 4.0%. Once the
Tequila crisis hit in late 1994, the non-performing loans of this sector increased from
20% of total loans to the sector to 24%, which is much smaller than the Mexican case and
slightly larger than in the Colombian case.
Another difference in banking practices between (a) Argentina on the one hand and (b)
Colombia and Mexico on the other is revealed by the non-performing loans coverage
ratio. 43 While Argentina's banking sector coverage was 55% in December 1994, it
quickly rose to 68% in 1996. In Mexico, the coverage ratio was 49% in 1994, and it had
risen to 55% by 1997. When the crisis begun in 1998, Colombia had an extremely low
38% coverage ratio, which then increased to 46% by the end of 2000.
Finally, the Chilean experience, as derived from the Conley-Maloney data on housing
prices, shows that the bubble was accompanied by rising domestic credit. In this case,
the credit explosion took place in 1976-1979, prior to the rise in property prices.44
However, the credit contraction did follow the fall in real estate prices, and the banking
crisis in late 1981 followed the collapse in real estate prices. This is another example of
the balance sheet effect operating. This bubble and the credit expansion occurred
immediately  before the banking crisis of the early 1980s.
42 World Bank staff estimates that the fiscal cost of the banking sector crisis in Mexico amounted to about
19% of GDP, and IMF staff estimates Colombia's banking sector rescue costs to be around 8% of GDP,
while there were no fiscal costs in Argentina.
43 The ratio of provisions for loan losses to non-performing loans.
44 We were unable  to ftnd a uniforrn data series of credit for the non-financial private sector, and, therefore,
we present only non-manipulated series. However, all the available series show the credit explosion in
1975-1979.20
C. Bubbles have long-lasting  consequences on poverty issues
Evidence from Mexico and Colombia (Appendix G) shows that, after the bubble bursts
and domestic credit contracts, the proportion of people who own the house in which they
live falls. This phenomenon tends to be more acute in the poorest quintiles. In 1995 in
Colombia, 68% of households fully owned the houses in which they lived; by 1999 (after
the crisis), this figure fell to 58%. In Mexico, the same statistic  fell from 72% to 66%
between 1995 and 2000. If middle-class  and poor people lose their main asset during
crises, their credit availability will be impaired in the future, given  that they lose their
only source of collateral. The fact that this phenomenon happens more often in middle-
and lower-income families will affect income distribution inequality  and, through this
channel, will affect long-run growth (Barro, 2000)
V.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS  AND CONCLUSIONS
After documenting  the existence of bubbles in Latin America, we examined their
determinants and provided evidence of the negative effect of asset price bubbles on the
financial sector, on investment,  on income distribution, and, thence, indirectly through all
these channels, on long-run growth. Therefore, the case for intervention to avoid bubbles
seems warranted. However, there are several problems, beginning with the identification
of bubbles, or asset price misaligrments. The main difficulty arises from the
observational  equivalence of a bubble with the expected future changes in fundamentals.
Circumventing  this discussion, we turn to examine what authorities  can do, based on our
findings concerning bubble determinants.
Regarding common external (global) factors, there is little that policymakers in Latin
America can do to influence their course.  Similarly, there is little that can be done about
country-specific,  but external factors which we considered, such as capital flows and
terms-of-trade shocks. There is ample literature about insulating the economy from
capital flows volatility, and evidence is mixed regarding its effectiveness  and costs
(Dooley, 1996; Montiel, 1999). Regarding terms-of-trade shocks, our results show that
there is still room for improvement  on stabilization funds and saving mechanisms that
buffer these recurrent shocks.
On the country-specific domestic factors the story is different. Given the difficulty of
identifying  the imminence of bubbles, authorities should permanently aim at smoothing
the cyclical behavior of credit for the private sector. To this end, policymakers could use
several tools. The first one would be the adoption of counter-cyclical  provisioning of
credit such that, during expansion phases, financial intermediaries  create capital cushions,
beyond the specific credit loss risks, to absorb potential losses during the crash.  This
generic provision would apply to all loans. Other types of restrictive policies could
restrain the use of stocks and real estate as collateral during booms. Alternatively, by
placing higher capital requirements for highly-leveraged customers, authorities can limit
the potential for bubble generation and posterior damage. Finally, a widely used
instrument in the past was the imposition of credit growth ceilings. The problem with21
these restrictive policies, with the exception of the generic counter-cyclical  provision, lies
in the difficulty of monitoring, and, hence, they are subject to regulation  arbitrage.
Another policy suggested to minimize the negative impact of the bursting of the bubble is
based on the fact that most developing countries have inefficient secondary markets for
family housing units. The functioning of this imperfect market is impaired even more
during crisis, when negative shocks hit the economy, and banks are stuck with
repossessed  collateral, which they pretend to dump in the market to obtain liquidity.
Because of this reason, analysts (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998) have proposed some type
of restraints on the disposition of real estate by commercial banks to prevent prices from
falling further during stress situations. In this setting, both borrowers and banks are
insured against price collapse, and consumers pay higher prices for real estate, but the
insurance  raises an ex-ante social surplus.
Rather than adopting policies that "throw sand into the wheels," others propose the
expansion  of the number and variety of markets to stabilize prices. For example, Shiller
(1993) argues for the creation of what he labeled macro markets. These are international
markets for long-term claims on the incomes of countries or different occupational
groups or markets for highly illiquid assets such as single-family homes. These are
complex securities that are  just being developed and are of very limited use. As an
example of one of the few cases where these concepts have been used, Bulgaria recently
issued GDP warrants as part of the Brady renegotiation.
Along this line, an option to develop real estate markets and diversify risk would be to
use Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) which are passive portfolio managers of real
estate properties (Herring and Wachter, 1999). These agents, whose shares are publicly
traded, act as mutual funds that hold property and generate income and tax-free capital
gains for individual investors. 45
Once a bubble is identified, attempting to puncture it is very risky. "Talking down" the
bubble might be a difficult task, and, as time goes by, authorities will be forced to
intervene  directly. Recent experience in the U.S. shows that policy intervention is not
exempt from costs. Another good example of the costs of attempting bubble-puncturing
interventions  is the Brazilian episode of the Real depreciation up to July of 2001. The
depreciating  trend of the Real (Graph 22) took the currency to around 2.50 per dollar by
the third week of June 2001. Because this movement was interpreted as being driven by
a speculative  bubble, the central bank abandoned its no-intervention  (in the foreign
exchange  market) policy, in effect since 1999, and sold dollars to "irrigate" the market,
according  to the central bank president. Selic interest rates were simultaneously raised by
150 basis points. The market welcomed the "Fraga moves" and the Real appreciated to
2.30 per dollar. Two weeks later, in the first week of July, the Real had fallen back to
2.55 per dollar, and the central bank lost approximately US$2 billion of reserves that the
IMF had disbursed in the last week of June (Graph 22). Additionally, on June 27, the
central  bank sold a total of $4 billion Reales (approximately  US$1.7 billion) in one-year,
45 The National Association of REITS (NAREIT) website presents detailed descriptions of the types of
trusts that exist.22
dollar-indexed bonds to stabilize the currency. Summing up the whole episode, the
central bank's net debt in foreign currency increased by US$6 billion, and the exchange
rate was at about the same level as before the attempt to puncture the bubble.23
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Graph 4
Stock Market Prices and Dividends in Latin America 1984 - 2001
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Real Domestic Credit Growth and Bubbles
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Table 1
Correlation Matrix of Stock Returns 1980 - 2001
Argentina  Brazil  Mexico  Peru  Chile  Colombia
Argentina  1.00  0.66  0.81  0.68  0.82  0.65
Brazil  0.66  1.00  0.50  0.42  0.62  0.32
Mexico  0.81  0.50  1.00  0.05  0.92  0.87
Peru  0.68  0.42  0.05  1.00  0.56  0.05
Chile  0.82  0.62  0.92  0.56  1.00  0.86
Colombia  0.65  0.32  0.87  0.05  0.86  1.00
TABLE 2
Unit Root, Cointegration and Tests for Long Run Relationship  between Returns
and (log) Dividend Yields.
RALS: Unit Root  RALS:  Johansen  ARDL: Test
Test  Cointegration  Cointegrating  on Long
Test  Vectors*  Run
Relationship
Total  Log of  No  Linear
Returns  Dividend  Data  Data
Yield  Trend  Trend
ARGENTINA  I(O)a  I(1)  Not  0  2  Long-run
cointegrated  relationshipb
BRAZIL  T(1)  I(1)  Not  0  0  No long-run
I______________  ________  cointegrated  relationship
CHILE  I(1)  I(1)  Not  0  0  No long-run
cointegrated  relationship
COLOMBIA  I(1)  I(1)  Not  0  0  No long-run
cointegrated  relationship
MEXICO  I(1)  1(Q)  Not  0  2  No long-run
cointegrated  relationship
PERU  I(1)  I(1)  Not  0  0  No long-run
I__________  I__cointegrated  __  relationship
*Results  based on the Trace. Two cointegrating vectors reflect the fact of stationarity in the series and
therefore  there is no cointegrating relation.
aResults  are sensitive to the inclusion (or not) of constant and trend. The series are I(l) when constant and
trend are not included in the regressions.
b Results are sensitive to the inclusion (or not) of constant and trend. There is no long-run relationship when
trend is not included in the regressions.50
Table 3
Correlation  Matrix of Residuals of the Intrinsic  Bubble Model 1980-2001
RINTRINBUB  ARG  RINTRINBUB  BRA  RINTRINBUB  CHL  RJNTRINBUB  COL  RINTRINBUB  MEX  RINTRINBUB  US
RINTRIJNBARG
1.00  0.03  0.29  -0.21  0.09  -0.16
RINTRINBUB  BRA  0.03  1.00  0.37  0.47  0.23  40.24
RINTRINBUB  CHL  0.29  0.37  1.00  0.33  0.37  -0.29
RINTRINBUB  COL  -0.21  0.47  0.33  1.00  0.26  -0.09
RINTRINBUB  MEX  0.09  0.23  0.37  0.26  1.00  0.08
RINTRINBUB_US  -0.16  -0.24  -0.29  -0.09  0.08  1.0051
Table 4
Correlation Matrix of Residuals  of the Intrinsic Bubble Model  1995-2001
P  RINTRINBUB  ARG  RINTRINBUB_BRA  RINTRINBUB  CHL  RINTRINBUB  COL  RINTPRNBUB_MEX  RINTRNBUB  US
PTRWINBIUBARG
1.00  -0.25  0.61  -0.31  0.52  40.01
RINTRINBUB_BRA  -0.25  100.16  -0.10  40.25  -0.27
RlNTRtNBUB  CHL  0.61  -0.16  1.00  -0.02  0.51  40.16
RtNTRtNBUB  COL  -0.31  -0.10  -0.02  1.00  -0.04  0.33
RINTNINBUB  MEX  0.52  .0.25  0.51  40.04  1.00  0.40
RlNTRINBUB  US  -0.01  -0.27  -0.16  0.33  0.40  1.0052
Table 5
Dummy variable for bubbles in the.  stock market 1984:12-2001:03*
Dates  Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Mexico  USA
1985-  *  1985:01-  *  1985:08-  *  1985:03-  *  1987:02-  *  1986:03-
1989  1985:09  1986:10  1985:07  1987:09  1987:10
*  1987:04  *  1986:03  *  1989:07-
*  1989:05-  1989:12
1989:09
1990-  *  1991:03-  *  1990:02  *  1991:09  *  1992:01-  *  1991:12-
1994  1992:07  *  1992:01-  *  1992:03-  1993:01  1992:05
1992:02  1992:07  *  1993:10-  *  1992:12-
*  1993:11-  *  1994:01-  1995:02  1994:03
1994:11  1995:10
1995-  *  1997:08-  *  1999:12-  *  1998:02-
2001  1998:01  2000:06  1998:05
*Except  for Colombial985:12-2001:03
Number of Bubbles and Crashes
LAC  BUBBLE  CRASH  1-CMAX CRASH  2-DLPRICE
Total  22  24  41
Total bubbles  ending with a crash  14  11  24
Independent  bubbles and crashes  6  9  13
Crashes  during bubbles or vice versa  2  4  453
Table 6
Tests of Unit Roots for Series with Structural Breaks
Log of stock  6-month moving  Domestic credit  Domestic
market prices in  average of capital  in real terms  credit growth
real terms  flows proxy  (DCR)  in real terms
(LGPRLCR)  (KFLO6)  (DCRG)
Argentina  1) 89:02  1) 91:09  1) 89:06  91:05
2)  2)  2)  84:05, 90:04
3)  89:02  3)  91:10  3) 82:08, 89:06
SETAR* 89:02
& 91:06
Brazil  1) 86:11  1)  1)  89:11  92:02
2) 90:10  _  2)  91:09  _
3)  3)  92:01  3)
SETAR* 93:04
Chile  1)  1) 91:09, 96:07  1) 89:05  82:06?
2)  91:07  2)  97:09  2)  83:07, 91:02
3)  _  3) 91:09, 97:12  3)
Colombia  1) 91:11  1  1)  91:10
2)  94:05  2)  97:02  2) 97:01
3) 91:06,98:02  3)  3)
Mexico  1)  1) 94:03  1)  88:08
2)  91:11  2)  91:10  2)  92:07
3)  86:05, 94:10  3)  3)
Peru  1) 97:10  1) 94:03  1) 88:02  90:08
2)  2)  96:09  2)  89:12
____________  _  3)  3)  3)
Note: Numerals on the table denote the equation used below. The methodology followed for unit root tests
is that as described in Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Vogelsang and Perron (1998). Initially we use the
"innovational outlier" (10) model where a dummy for a break in the level is allowed along with a dummy
for a break in the trend at an unknown time (equation 1). We used two restricted models (equation 2 and 3),
when only a break in the trend or a break in the level were more appropriate. Also to complement the break
in the level model, we made use of the SETAR  method as described by S.M Potter (1995).
k
Yv =P+/,I  +yDT,  +ODU,  +ay,l  +LCAy,-i  +Ut  (I)
i=l
k
Yt  =±+A  +yDT, +ay,-,  +Ec1 yi  +  U  (2)
i=1
k
yt =  +j,  +DU,  +ay,  +  +  ci  ,Ay-i +  U  (3)
where DU= I if t>Tbt  and 0 otherwise, DT = t -Tb if t > Tb,  and 0 otherwise, k =  number of lags according to the ADF general to
specific methodology  for lag selection.54
Table 7
PANEL  DATA:  LoGIT RESULTS  (ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  CHILE, COLOMBIA  AND
MEXICO)
Dependent  Variable:  DUSUM
Method:  ML  - Binary  Logit  (Quadratic  hill  climbing)
Sample(adjusted):  60 1272
Included  observations:  815
Excluded  observations:  398  after  adjusting  endpoints
Convergence  achieved  after 6 iterations
QML  (HuberNVhite)  standard  errors  & covariance
Variable  Coefficient  Std.  Error  z-Statistic  Prob.
NSPR103  1.481  0.176  8.407  0.000
NRINTRINBUBUS  -0.282  0.135  -2.098  0.036
NEQREIDEV  0.637  0.151  4.217  0.000
NDCRGHAT(-12)  -0.426  0.195  -2.184  0.029
NDCRGHAT(-18)  0.530  0.143  3.696  0.000
NKFLO6HAT  0.408  0.210  1.938  0.053
NTOTDEV  0.659  0.107  6.150  0.000
NVOL24DLDCRHAT  0.367  0.227  1.614  0.107
NVOL24DLGTRLCRHAT  0.600  0.301  1.996  0.046
DARG  -3.281  0.328  -10.006  0.000
DBRA  -3.465  0.429  -8.085  0.000
DCHL  -1.395  0.275  -5.070  0.000
DCOL  -1.079  0.226  -4.775  0.000
DMEX  -2.117  0.270  -7.843  0.000
Mean  dependent  var  0.189  S.D.  dependent  var  0.392
S.E.  of regression  0.324  Akaike  info  criterion  0.706
Sum  squared  resid  84.322  Schwarz  criterion  0.787
Log  likelihood  -273.880  Hannan-Quinn  criter.  0.737
Avg.  log likelihood  -0.336
Obs  with  Dep=0  Total  obs  815
Obswith  Dep=1  661.0
DUSUM  = Bubbles  dummy;  it is  equal  to I when  durintrinbub  = I (when  rintrinbub  > I standard  deviation),  or when
dudiffnorm  dummy  = I [when  the difference  of the normalized  price  (gprlcr)  -normalized  Present  value
(K*Dividends)>1.3  ], and 0 otherwise.
NSPRI  03  =Normalized  Spread  between  the 10-year  and 3 month  US  t bills
NRINTRINBUBUS  = Normalized  residual  of US intrinsic  bubble
NEQREIDEV  = Normalized  deviations  of the equity  real  estate  variable
NDCRGHAT(-12)  =Normalized  domestic  credit  growth  in real  terms  at t-12  months
NDCRGHAT(-18)  =  Normalized  domestic  credit  growth  in real  terms  at t-18  months
NKFL06HAT  = Normalized  6-month  moving  average  capital  flows  proxy
NTOTDEV  = Normalized  Terms  of trade  deviation
NVOL24DLDCRHAT  =Normalized  24 month moving  window  of a standard  deviation  of the differenced  log  of
domestic  credit  in  real  terms.
NVOL24DLGTRLCRHAT  = Normalized  24  month  moving  window  of a standard  deviation  of the first
difference  of  the log of the real  global  total  return  series
DARG  = Argentina  dummy
DBRA  = Brazil  dummy
DCHL  = Chile  dummy
DCOL  = Colombia  dummy
DMEX=  Mexico  dummy.
Note:  Variables  with  the suffix  HATP  are fitted  values  of the variables  used  as instrumental  variables55
TABLE  8
Marginal Probabilities
Domestic  EQR  Capital  U.S.  Spread between  Terms of  Volatility in  Volatility in
credit growth  EIDEV  flows  residual  10-year  and 3-  trade  real  real total
intrinsic  month t-bill  deviation  domestic  returns
bubble  credit
Argentina  0.0798  0.0504  0.0365  -0.0196  0.1199  0.0566  0.0306  0.0523
Brazil  0.0698  0.0441  0.0319  -0.0171  0.1048  0.0495  0.0267  0.0457
Chile  0.0906  0.0573  0.0414  -0.0223  0.1362  0.0642  0.0348  0.0594
Colombia  0.0977  0.0618  0.0447  -0.0240  0.1469  0.0693  0.0375  0.0640
M6xico  0.0922  0.0582  0.0421  -0.0227  0.1385  0.0653  0.0353  0.060456
Table  9
Causality Results: Stock Market Returns, Consumption, and Investment










From  D(Consumption)  D(Return)








Note: Countries  with *  the series are both  I(l)  and we tested
cointegration.  For those variables  no cointegrated  we did granger
causality  in  the differences  of the variables.  In variables  cointegrated
we performed  a wald test for the relevance  of the difference  of the
lagged  explanatory  variable  and  the lagged  error  correction  term.57
Table  10
Panel results: SUR estimation
Dependent  Variable:  GDITOY?
Method:  Seemingly  Unrelated  Regression
Sample:  1980  1999
Included  observations:  20
Number  of cross-sections  used:  5
Total  panel  (unbalanced)  observations:  91
One-step  weighting  matrix
Variable  Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
C  20.735  1.758  11.795  0.000
FDITOYHATP  0.500  0.275  1.817  0.073
GOVYCHATP  -0.099  0.034  -2.908  0.005
GOVYKHATP  0.454  0.110  4.124  0.000
LGPRLCRHATP  0.923  0.361  2.559  0.012
VOL12DLGTRLCRHATP  -10.133  4.585  -2.210  0.030
GROHATP(-1)  0.364  0.155  2.348  0.021
STATEFAILAVG  -12.071  1.861  -6.487  0.000
Weighted  Statistics
Unweighted  Statistics
R-squared  0.393  Mean  dependent  var  20.69
Adjusted  R-squared  0.341  S.D. dependent  var  3.57
S.E.  of regression  2.893  Sum  squared  resid  694.90
Durbin-Watson  stat  0.811
GDITOY = Gross domestic investment (% to GDP)
FDITOYHATP  = Foreign direct investment  (% to GDP)
GOVYCHATP  = Government consumption (% to GDP)
GOVYKHATP  =  Public capital expenditures (% to GDP)
STATEFAILAVG  = Average of "Episodes of State Failure" as defined by the State Polity 98 from the
University of Maryland. It includes Ethnic Wars, Revolutionary Wars, Abrupt or Disruptive
Regime Changes, and Genocides/Politicides.
VOL  12DLGTRLCRHATP=  12 month moving window of a standard deviation of the first difference of the
log of the real global total return series.
GROHATP = GDP growth.
Note: Variables with the suffix HATP are instrumental variables; they are derived by running a panel
regression for each (except statefailavg) independent  variable (Xi,  ) on the other independent  variables; the
residuals from each panel regression are saved and the fitted values are calculated by subtracting the
residuals from the dependent variable. These fitted values are the ones used in the above estimation.58
Table 11
Argentina  Colombia  Mexico
Credit to  Credit to  Credit to  Credit to
housing as construction as  construction as  construction and
hare of  share of total  share of total  housing as share
total credit credit  Housing Price Index/CPI  credit  Housing Price Index/CPI  of total credit  Housing Price Index/CPI
(Average)  (Growth)  (Average)  (Growth)  (Average)  (Growth)
1984  10,80  0.77
1985  9.70  0.71  -7.79
1986  10.80  0.69  7.40  0.69  -2.82
1987  11.10  0.68  -1.00  6.80  0.59  -14.4
1988  13.10  0.71  4.40  11.10  0.61  3.3
1989*  16.20  0.64  -9.90  27.99  0.91  11.50  0.78  27.87
1990**  13.05  6.20  0.71  10.60  28.49  0.90  -1.10  13.50  0.89  14.1
991  14.20  6.50  0.82  15.60  21.04  0.90  0.00  13.60  0.95  6.7
1992  12.80  5.40  0.88  6.80  20.55  0.89  -1.11  12.10  0.97  2.11
1993  9.80  4.20  0.94  7.00  24.46  0.92  3.37  13.10  0.98  1.03
1994  10.30  4.20  0.98  4.10  30.11  0.94  2.17  13.40  1.00  2.0
1995  12.20  4.40  0.99  1.60  30.35  0.96  2.13  14.20  0.96  4.0
1996  12.70  4.10  0.99  0.10  28.21  0.98  2.08  13.40  0.92  -4.17
1997  13.00  3.60  0.98  -1.10  22.69  0.99  1.02  13.70  0.92  0.0
1998  16.70  0.98  -1.01
1999  1  18.82  0.97  -1.02
Sources:  Argentina:  Boletin  Estadistico  del Banco Central de la Republica  Argentina Colombia:  Banco de la Republica.  Mexico:  INEGI.
Argentina:  Housing  credit from banks  and savings  institutions.  Construction  credit from financial  institutions.
Colombia:  Construction  credit  from savings  and housing corporations.
* Argentina  1989 credit  to housing  is datum  for Aug. '89 and it excludes  foreign  currency  lending.
** Argentina  1990  credit to housing  is datum  for January '91 and it includes  foreign  currency  mortgage  lending.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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